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The following documents
are examples of materials that have recently come to light through
Freedom of Information Act requests or research at the National
Archives. At least two
internal histories are known to exist--still--but only one of those is
available in meaningful form. That document, written in March 1954 by
coup planner Donald Wilber and originally published in 2000 by The
New York Times,
is available from this link. Below are the declassified
documents.
Document No. 1: National
Security Council, NSC 136/1, "United States Policy regarding the Present
Situation in Iran," Top Secret Report, November 20, 1952
Source: National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record
Group 59, "Records relating to State Department Participation in the
Operations Coordinating Board and the National Security Council,
1947-1963," Lot 63D351, National Security Council, Box 68, Folder: "NSC
136: U.S. and Policy regarding the Present Situation in Iran"
This was the last policy statement on
Iran prepared during the Truman administration. Truman and his top
advisers always focused on working out an oil agreement between Mosaddeq
and British. To the end, they believed that Mosaddeq represented the
most effective barrier to a communist takeover in Iran. This view
differed sharply from the Eisenhower administration's, which held that
Mosaddeq's inability to withstand Tudeh subversion or a coup made him a
liability that had been removed. Truman's fears about the deterioration
of conditions in Iran grew while he was in office, leading him to
declare, as in this document, his readiness to deal militarily with a
communist coup. But he never reached the point of considering an
anticipatory move as Eisenhower ultimately did. Still, the steady
progression of his views raises the interesting hypothetical question of
whether, had he remained in office for another term, Truman might have
eventually followed the same path.
Document No. 2: State
Department, "First Progress Report on Paragraph 5-a of NSC 136/1, 'U.S.
policy regarding the present situation in Iran'," Top Secret Memorandum,
March 20, 1953
Source: National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record
Group 59, "Records relating to State Department Participation in the
Operations Coordinating Board and the National Security Council,
1947-1963," Lot 63D351, National Security Council, Box 68, Folder: "NSC
136: U.S. and Policy regarding the Present Situation in Iran"
One of the points of interest about
this memo is that it is a progress report from the Eisenhower period on
a policy adopted by President Truman. It is of particular importance
because it focuses on a series of specific covert measures the U.S.
planned to take in the event of "an attempted or an actual communist
seizure of power" in Iran - one of the aspects of US policy that long
remained out of reach for historians because it was classified. In fact,
the section under discussion, paragraph 5-a of NSC 136/1 (see previous
document), was redacted in the policy document itself but has been
included - and of course elaborated on in detail - in this follow-up
report.
Document No. 3: State
Department, "Measures which the United States Government Might Take in
Support of a Successor Government to Mosadeq," Top Secret Memorandum,
March 1953.
Source: National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA), Record Group 59, Records of the
Officer-in-charge of Iranian Affairs, 1946-1954, Lot 57D529, Box 40,
Folder: Policy
This fascinating memo lists several
proposed steps to take in the event - apparently still hypothetical at
this stage - of a coup against Mosaddeq by "a successor government we
wish to support." The document is referred to in the CIA's "Zendebad
Shah!" history (below) in footnote 66 on page 19. The gist of the
memo's recommendations is to make sure the new government and the Shah
were aware that the United States was ready to offer support. But the
authors make clear that any substantive measures would have to be taken
outside of the public eye since it "would be literally fatal to any
non-communist successor to Mosaddeq if the Iranian public gained an
impression that the new premier was a 'foreign tool'."
Document No. 4: State
Department, "Proposed Course of Action with Respect to Iran," Top Secret
Draft Memorandum, August 10, 1953
Source: National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA), Record Group 59, Policy Planning Staff
1947-53, Box 42, Lot 64D563, Folder: Record Copies, July-Aug 1953
Written just five days before the
initial launching of the coup, this memo reflects several interesting
points. For one, it shows how completely out of the picture some parts
of the U.S. government were regarding the operation. Months after
Eisenhower's top advisers had given up on winning an oil settlement with
Mosaddeq, this paper continues to recommend steps in that direction.
Equally interesting are the author's assessments of Iran's political and
economic situation, which are at odds with the views of top
policy-makers that led them to approve the coup. Specifically, the
author downplays the likelihood of a Tudeh overthrow attempt, saying the
party is not "sufficiently strong or well-organized to attempt a coup."
He does point up the longer-term threat of the Tudeh building power and
prestige, as did those who supported the intervention. The author of
this memo also indicates that Iran's economy, while deteriorating, is
"in balance" in several areas and continues to allow the government to
"meet its fiscal needs."
Document No. 5: CIA, "Zendebad,
Shah!": The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian
Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953," Top Secret Draft
History, History Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1998.
Source: Freedom of Information Act
lawsuit
This 139-page internal history prepared
by the CIA's History Staff became available in highly redacted form
after the National Security Archive filed a lawsuit with the CIA in 1999
for materials relating to Iran in 1953. At first it was denied in its
entirety, then upon review sections already marked Unclassified were
released (for the most part), along with a single section previously
marked Secret (but apparently based primarily on a published account).
The document is potentially of great historical value because it was
prepared by a trained historian with the benefit of a variety of
still-classified supporting documentation and many years of historical
perspective. As such, it would be extremely useful to compare it with
the only other extant internal history, which by contrast was written by
one of the coup's main architects, Donald Wilber, just a few months
after the operation. In its current largely inaccessible state, however,
the document is mostly a testament to the continuing obstacles faced by
researchers to a more complete understanding of the coup.
3. The
"Secrets of History" from the New York Times.
4. In 1999 the CIA continued to fight the
release of the truth about the 1953 covert action in Iran. In a
sworn
statement by William McNair (the information review officer for the
CIA’s directorate of operations), McNair claimed that release of any
other part of this document other than the one line that had previously
appeared in Wilber’s memoirs, would “reasonably be expected to cause
serious damage to the national security of the United States.”
5. Abbie Hoffman and Jonathan Silvers, "An
Election Held Hostage," Playboy, October 1988, pages 73-74 &150-155.
6. Robert Parry's three part series on the
October Surprise.
Part 1 -
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2006/102506.html
Part 2 -
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2006/102706.html
Part 3 -
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2006/102906.html
Also by
Robert Parry -
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2006/110906.html.
7. Ray McGovern -
http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/66/23799
Also
Gary Sick's book, "The October Surprise."
Gary Sick, an
American diplomat wrote “The October Surprise” that the Reagan
presidential campaign negotiated with Iran to delay the release
of the hostages until after Reagan won the election. Gary Sick
was a member of the Carter administration and a member of staff
of the National Security Council from August 1976 to April 1981.
According to his congressional testimony he said “ In the course
of hundreds of interviews in the US, Europe and the Middle
East, I’ve been told repeatedly that individuals associated with
the Reagan Bush campaign of 1980 met secretly with Iranian
officials to delay the release of the American hostages until
after the Presidential election. For this favor, Iran was
rewarded with a substantial supply of arms from Israel.”
According to
Mr. Sick, low level intelligence operatives and arms dealers are
no boy scouts, “Their accounts were not identical, but on the
central facts were remarkably consistent.” Because of my past
government experience I knew about certain events that could not
possibly be known to most of the sources. Yet their stories
confirm these fact.
In a series
of meetings from October 15th to October 20th
1980 events came to a head in meetings in Paris. “Accounts of
these meetings vary, There is, however, widespread agreement on
a number of points.” One, “William Casey, Reagan’s campaign
manager was a key participant. Two, Iranian representatives
agreed that the hostages would not be released prior to the
presidential election on November 4th. Three, “Israel
would serve as a conduit for arms and spare parts to Iran.”
“At least
five of the sources that said they were at these meetings insist
that George H.W. Bush was present at least for one meeting.
Resources say they saw him there.”
According to
Sick’s congressional testimony, immediately after the Paris
meetings things began to happen. Iran publicly shifted its
position in the negotiations with the Carter administration.
Sick also said “Between October 21st and October 23rd,
Israel sent a planeload of F-4 fighter aircraft tires to Iran in
contravention of the US boycott and without informing
Washington.
In 1991, a
congressional committee, led by Democratic Congressman Lee
Hamilton (also the man who served a whitewash role as the
co-commissioner of the 9/11 Commission), declared there was no
credible evidence linking Reagan’s team to the delay of the
hostage release.
According to
Sick, one of the hostages he shared his evidence with said, “I
don’t want to believe it. It’s too painful to think about.” Sick
summed up what happened in 1980 and 1981 with "We know what to
do with someone caught misappropriating funds, but when
confronted with evidence of a systematic attempt to undermine
the political system itself, we recoil in a general failure of
imagination and nerve."
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